Can transparent markets survive
By Robert J. Bloomfield, Maureen O’Hara. 2000
162 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/047824e56c838fca4480e65d269a9042d8bac063
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Terrence Hendershott
- Bruno Biais
- Chester Spatt
- Lawrence R. Glosten
- Hans Degryse
- Mark Van Achter
- Michael J. Barclay
- Gunther Wuyts
In Finance
- Terrence Hendershott
- Michael J. Barclay
- Bruno Biais
- Chester Spatt
- Lawrence R. Glosten
- Hans Degryse
- Peter Feldhütter
- Albert J. Menkveld
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Terrence Hendershott
- Michael J. Barclay
- Bruno Biais
- Chester Spatt
- Lawrence R. Glosten
- Hans Degryse
- Tālis J. Putniņš
- Albert J. Menkveld
Citations in the corpus
- Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives (2005, unknown): “Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999, 2000) have shown through trading experiments that in opaque markets, the informed players emerge as liquidity-providers and post narrower bid-ask spreads (compared to other agents and more transparent markets).”
- An Empirical Study of Bond Market Transactions (2000, background): “For example, Bloomfield and O’Hara (2000) investigated whether transparent markets (such as the ABS) can survive in an environment where less transparent markets (such as the dealer market) are also present.”
- Market Microstructure: A Survey (2000, unknown): “Experimental studies Bloom"eld and O'Hara (1999a, b) compare and contrast markets with di!erent sets of disclosure standards. Speci"cally, their experiments have human agents who act as dealers, some whom do not disclose trades, while others do. Bloom"eld and O'Hara (1999b) allow disclosing and non-”
- Market Transparency, Liquidity Externalities, and Institutional Trading Costs in Corporate Bonds (2006, unknown): “…an opaque market might give market makers incentives to quote narrow bid-ask spreads, because the order flow attracted by narrow spreads contains valuable information about market fundamentals, and Bloomfield and O’Hara (2000) provide experimental evidence generally consistent with this reasoning.”
- Price Discovery and Trading After Hours (2003, result): “9 The decay of private information over the trading period has also been found in laboratory experiments [Bloomfield (1996), Bloomfield and O'Hara (2000) and others] and on the NYSE [Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomas (1997), although they find a slight increase in the last half-hour of the trading da”
- Dynamic Order Submission Strategies with Competition between a Dealer Market and a Crossing Network (2007, background): “tween trading systems (for an overview see Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005) ).”
- Market Microstructure: A Survey of Microfoundations, Empirical Results, and Policy Implications (2005, background): “(47)Blume and Goldstein (1997) and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) provide empirical evidence of effective fragmentation.”