A touching sight: SII/PV activation during the observation and experience of touch.

By Christian Keysers, Bruno Wicker, Valeria Gazzola, Jean-Luc Anton, Leonardo Fogassi, Vittorio Gallese †. Neuron, 2004

859 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Social Psychology, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/03d6502c0889b34f37a63869fe76ef6f0c8c974b

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Citations in the corpus

Embodied simulation: From neurons to phenomenal experience (2005, background): “Results indicated that even seeing an object getting touched produced a significantly larger activation of SII/PV compared to seeing the object being only approached (see Keysers et al. 2004).”
Discriminative and affective touch: sensing and feeling. (2014, background): “…cortices, indicating that membership of a tactile group may well confer a vicarious benefit without participation in mutual or self-touch behaviors (Keysers et al., 2004; Blakemore et al., 2005; Ebisch et al., 2008; McCabe et al., 2008; Bastiaansen et al., 2009; Morrison et al., 2011b;…”
My body in the brain: a neurocognitive model of body-ownership. (2010, neutral): “…after synchronous, compared with uncorrelated, visuotactile training, independently of the previously viewed object (rubber hand or neutral object), suggesting that this early effect is modulated by temporal contiguity, but not by pre-existing body representations (see also Keysers et al., 2004).”
Shared Neural Circuits for Mentalizing about the Self and Others (2010, background): “The first system, coding for low-level embodied/ simulative representations, exists within frontal operculum/ ventral premotor cortex (FO/PMv) (Gazzola & Keysers, 2009; Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh, & Keysers, 2006; Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), somatosensory cortices (SI/SII) (Bl”
The neuronal basis and ontogeny of empathy and mind reading: review of literature and implications for future research. (2006, methodology): “In the experiments undertaken so far (Wicker et al., 2003; Keysers et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2004a, 2006; Morrison et al., 2004), subjects were neither required to make any explicit judgment about the feelings of the other person (for an exception see Avenanti et al., 2005, commented on by…”
Empathy: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Approach (2009, background): “Similarly, the secondary somatosensory cortex is activated both when one is touched and when one observes someone else being touched (Keysers et al., 2004).”
Mentalizing in the Development and Treatment of Attachment Trauma (2013, background): “Moreover, mirror neurons are involved not only in perception of action but also perception of sensation: these neurons in the somatosensory cortex fire not only when you are being touched but also when you observe someone else being touched (Keysers et al., 2004).”
Dissecting the Neural Mechanisms Mediating Empathy (2011, background): “In one study, similar activations in the secondary somatosensory cortex were detected when participants were exposed to videos of someone else’s legs being touched with a stick and when they were being actually touched on their legs (Keysers et al., 2004).”
Habeas Corpus: The Sense of Ownership of One ' s Own Body (2007, background): “This possibility goes against the hypothesis of shared representations of bodily sensations ( Keysers et al. , 2004; Singer et al. , 2004; Decety and Jackson, 2004 ).”
Understanding Others: Brain Mechanisms of Theory of Mind and Empathy (2008, result): “These results are in line with the role of somatosensory cortices for the processing of touch (Ebisch et al., 2008; Keysers et al., 2004).”
The Social Neuroscience of Empathy (2009, background): “” Surprisingly, it took quite some time for the field of neuroscience and in particular of functional neuroimaging to dare to make contributions to this challenging pursuit (Carr et al. 2003; Keysers et al. 2004; Morrison et al. 2004; Singer et al. 2004; Wicker et al. 2003).”
How Stories Make Us Feel: Toward an Embodied Narratology (2011, background): “Similar direct matching mechanisms have been described for the perception of pain (Hutchison et al. 1999; Singer et al. 2004; Avenanti et al. 2005; Jackson et al. 2005; Botvinick et al. 2005) and touch (Keysers et al. 2004; Blakemore et al. 2005; Ebisch et al. 2008, 2010).”
Empathy for positive and negative emotions in the gustatory cortex (2007, background): “…simultaneously hears a g on the trial at hand) by means of the 5-ml syringe connected to the tubing h a voice counting from three to start as in Keysers et al. (2004) (middle row). tation of a cross that follows the black screen, instructing subjects to keep the n the screen, instructing…”
Neural signatures of body ownership: a sensory network for bodily self-consciousness. (2007, background): “More specifically, as suggested in the relevant literature (Hari et al. 1998; Ruby and Decety 2001; Keysers et al. 2004), self--other distinctions seem to involve specifically the ''left'' secondary somatosensory cortex.”
Mirror Neurons, Embodied Simulation, and the Neural Basis of Social Identification (2009, neutral): “…mechanisms have been described for the perception of pain (Botvinick et al., 2005; Hutchison, Davis, Lozano, Tasker, & Dostrovsky, 1999; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005; Singer et al., 2004; Ebisch et al., 2008) and touch (Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, Frith, & Ward, 2005; Keysers et al., 2004).”
The use of visual feedback, in particular mirror visual feedback, in restoring brain function. (2009, background): “Intriguingly, many of these—the 'touch mirror neurons'—fire not only when you are being touched but also when you watch someone being touched (Keysers C et al., 2004).”
The case for motor involvement in perceiving conspecifics. (2005, background): “Indeed, we know that watching others does result in first-person sensory activation, as shown, for example, by activation of secondary somatosensory cortex when watching another person being touched (Keysers et al., 2004).”
How do we perceive the pain of others? A window into the neural processes involved in empathy (2005, background): “Recently, a number of neuroimaging studies demonstrated that similar networks of brain areas are activated by the perception of facial expression depicting emotions and the overt expression of similar emotions (Carr et al., 2003; Ekman and Davidson, 1993, Leslie et al., 2004), the visual perception ”