Veto Players and Institutional Analysis

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Uncertainty, Imitation, and Plant Location: Japanese Multinational Corporations, 1990‐1996 (2001, result): “These results are consistent with the theoretical work of Tsebelis (2000) and Hammond and Butler (1996).”
A long goodbye to Bismarck? The politics of welfare reform in Continental Europe (2008, positive): “Bismarckian welfare systems are often seen as ‘frozen’ not only due to strong public support but also due to institutionalized veto points (Immergut 1991) that provide particularistic interests groups, that is veto players (Tsebelis 2000) with potential ‘veto power’.”
Elections, Political Competition and Bank Failure (2014, background): “These kinds of transactions costs are often referred to as veto points (Tsebelis, 1995, 2002).”
Are Parliamentary Systems Better? (2009, background): “Conceivably, the only consequential difference between these two constitutional molds is that one system (presidentialism), by virtue of greater institutional fragmentation, offers greater resistance to change (Tsebelis, 2000).”