Toward a New Theory of Institutional Change

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When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, World Views, and Policy Innovations (2014, unknown): “ It may be used to provide aid donors with cover in case of failure, as a signal for new governments that they are the “good guys,” and by domestic lobbies to legitimize their own self‐interested agenda (Weyland 2008).”
Do fiscal rules cause better fiscal balances? A new instrumental variable strategy (2019, background): “Not for Redistribution 4 socialization, mimicking, and coercion (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett, 2007; and Shipan and Volden, 2008; Markoff, 1996; Weyland, 2008; Buera and others, 2011; and Giuliano and others, 2013).”
The Diffusion of Regime Contention in European Democratization, 1830-1940 (2010, background): “In general terms, critical junctures arise not only from domestic “demand” but also from external “supply,” namely the impulse emanating from a foreign precedent (Weyland, 2008, pp. 289-296).”
When Do Institutions “Bite”? Historical Institutionalism and the Politics of Institutional Change (2016, background): “This theoretical emphasis may result in a conception of institutions as overly plastic (e.g., Hall, 2010b; Pierson, 2006, p. 116; Weyland, 2008, p. 284), one that ultimately undertheorizes their causal role in politics, and in particular their role in the processes by which they themselves change…”