Environmental controls with corrupt bureaucrats

By R. Damania. Environment and Development Economics, 2002

158 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/024d4e42cc7be0c457c80ebcca0a223472625eca

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Marina Povitkina
2. R. Quentin Grafton *
3. Reyer Gerlagh
4. L. Pellegrini
5. S. Knowles
6. Muhammad Shahbaz
7. Gustavo A. Marrero
8. E. Papyrakis

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Marina Povitkina
2. R. Quentin Grafton *
3. Reyer Gerlagh
4. L. Pellegrini
5. S. Knowles
6. Gustavo A. Marrero
7. Muhammad Shahbaz
8. E. Papyrakis

Citations in the corpus

• Corruption, Democracy, and Environmental Policy (2006, background): “Damania (2002) showed that environmental regulations are ineffective if bureaucrats are highly corrupted.”
• The limits of democracy in tackling climate change (2018, background): “underreport emission levels instead of enforcing compliance with the regulations and fine unlawful emitting behavior (Damania 2002).”
• Social Capital and National Environmental Performance: A Cross-Sectional Analysis (2004, background): “Damania (2002) has also developed a theoretical model to show how corruption may contribute to environmental degradation.”