Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection

By Kishore Gawande, U. Bandyopadhyay. Review of Economics and Statistics, 2000

544 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/020599122392ab8050675c3efc95d366e780c6b9

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Citations in the corpus

The political economy of international factor mobility (2005, unknown): “20 Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and McCalman (2004), modelling the role of lobbying by the producers of one intermediate input in the trade context, show that a similar effect obtains between the one input and output.”
Lobbying Competition Over Trade Policy (2005, methodology): “Since the standard errors of the elasticity estimates are known, they are treated as variables with measurement error and adjusted using a Fuller-correction (Fuller 1986; see also Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000).”
Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy? (2008, background): “Data on PAC campaign contributions has been used 26 extensively in the international economics literature, but does not allow researchers to disentangle the different purposes for which a contribution is made (see for example, Goldberg and Maggi 1999, and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000).”
The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches (2005, unknown): “Both Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Maggi and Goldberg (1999) have estimated extended models by including on the right-hand side of (7) a large number of additional regressors.”
The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies: Recent Contributions, New Insights, and Areas for Further Research (2010, background): “For example, studies by Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), and Cadot, de Melo, and Olarreaga (2004) estimate that the weights associated with lobbying are very low, and that the weights attached to general welfare in the politician’s objective function is much higher than…”
Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization (2017, methodology): “See www.lobbyview.org for the detailed description of the algorithm. other work that focuses on industry-level campaign contributions (e.g., Bombardini 2008; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000; Goldberg and Maggi 1999).”
Policy Influence and Private Returns from Lobbying in the Energy Sector (2016, background): “See, for example, Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), and Gawande et al. (2005).”