Opacity and the Optimality of Debt for Liquidity Provision

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Let's Talk About the Weather: The Impact of Climate Change on Central Banks (2016, background): “35 Disclosure of information that is hard to interpret could also encourage uninformed investors to hold less information-sensitive debt, and the resulting fall in the cost of debt relative to equity could encourage firms to take on greater leverage (Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2009)).”
Macroeconomics after the Crisis: Time to Deal with the Pretense-of-Knowledge Syndrome (2010, unknown): “Taking a very different agency approach, and thinking about the specifics of the high-frequency repo market, Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2009) show how a negative aggregate shock can cause debt to become information sensitive, impeding the efficient trading of assets.”
Money creation and the shadow banking system (2015, result): “This is also consistent with the predictions of Equation (5).”
TBA Trading and Liquidity in the Agency MBS Market (2013, unknown): “Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2009) present a related model in which shocks to fundamentals can generate adverse selection and market freezes.”
Illiquidity and All Its Friends (2011, background): “10 Dang et al (2009) make a simple, but important observation: a security’s information intensity varies with news accruing about the quality of underlying asset or borrower.”