Globalization Pressures and the State: The Worldwide Spread of Central Bank Independence1

By Simone Polillo, Mauro F. Guillén. American Journal of Sociology, 2005

410 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Finance, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/01097c09819959968a624413200bd0ee2a87836a

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Citations in the corpus

The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies (2011, positive): “With a few notable exceptions (i.e., Gilardi, 2008; Polillo & Guillén, 2005), these studies do not adopt a diffusion perspective.”
Does Economic Freedom Foster Tolerance (2013, methodology): “CBI Central-bank independence (measured from 0 to 1, where 1 is the highest degree of independence and 0 is the lowest degree) Polillo and Guillén (2005) 0.297 0.185 0 0.77 East Asia dummy Dummy for East Asian countries WDI (World Bank, 2011) 0.16 0.37 0 1 European dummy Dummy for European…”
The Worldwide Diffusion of Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reform, 1977–1999 (2005, background): “…emphasizes imitation among countries linked to each other through social ties (Guler, Guillén, and Macpherson 2002; Kobrin 1985; Levi-Faur 2002; Polillo and Guillén 2005; Simmons and Elkins 2004) and the latter stresses imitation among countries competing for foreign capital (Guler et al.…”
Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World (2010, methodology): “41 Central bank independence data come from Polillo and Guillén (2005), based on the Cukierman index. hypothesis, I included a measure of foreign aid as a percentage of GDP.”
The Construction of a Global Profession: The Transnationalization of Economics1 (2006, background): “…maintain—a place in the worldwide community of national economic actors and to look like responsible states, legitimate trading partners, sound international borrowers, or attractive locations for foreign direct investment (Schneider 1998; Polillo and Guillén 2005; Brune, Garrett, and Kogut 2004).”
The crisis of neoliberalism and the future of international institutions: A comparison of the IMF and the WTO (2009, background): “…important and visible role in the formulation of neoliberal prescriptions, to their legitimation, and in their enforcement worldwide.1 1 For more on IMF impact, see Polillo and Guillén 2005; Henisz et al. 2005; Nooruddin and Simmons 2006; Barro and Lee 2002; Vreeland 2003; Ingram et al. 2005.”
The Consequences of Economic Globalization for Affluent Democracies (2007, background): “So, even though globalization may influence macroeconomic management (Polillo & Guillén 2005), its influence should not be overstated (Wilensky 2002).”
The political economy of reforms in central bank design: evidence from a new dataset (2018, positive): “Regarding profit allocation, in particular, Reis (2013) argues that governments under fiscal stress will be tempted to demand the central bank to generate more profits and transfer them to the Treasury.”
More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries (2020, positive): “Garriga’s dataset covers 159 non-OECD countries, from 1970 to 2012, significantly expanding Cukierman et al.’s (1992) own data, and other efforts to extend them (Bodea and Hicks, 2015a; Crowe and Meade, 2007; Polillo and Guillén, 2005).”